

Community Representation Initiative (CRI) Discussion Question Responses

They Navy will strive to answer any properly submitted questions that are within the scope of the CRI, as described in the 2023 Administrative Consent Order (ACO), before the next twice-quarterly CRI meeting.

Questions within the scope of the CRI will also be used to inform the agenda for upcoming CRI meetings to facilitate forward-looking discourse between CRI members, Navy, DLA, and EPA.

To ensure that questions are received, please submit to the dedicated CRI email address below:

CRI_questions@us.navy.mil

The responses below are provided with the best information currently available. The responses are in keeping with the principal purpose of the CRI to be a forward-looking dialog. Questions related to matters pertaining to litigation cannot be addressed, as the Department of Defense does not comment on current or pending litigation.

To provide a common point of reference, questions/responses will refer to the numbering convention found in the 'question tracking page' of the spreadsheet provided by email from CRI member Susan Gorman-Chang titled 'updated 11-1-2023 unanswered questions tracking (1)(autosaved)'.

Question 1, Lacey Quintero - What are your procedures for notifying people, military and non-military, people who live on the line, civilians, schools in the area, locations close to the pier, in case of worst case scenario such as, but not limited to, fires, explosions, leak.

We understand, from a big picture perspective, the groups you will be assembling (State Emergency Response Center, EPA, Joint Information Center, etc.) but what SPECIFIC modes of communication in a MINUTE BY MINUTE plan, will be undertaken in the minutes following a worst case scenario, in order to communicate.

Response:

Getting information out to the public will be a team effort. Navy has worked and continues to work with the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency (HI-EMA) and the City and County of Honolulu Department of Emergency Management (DEM). ☐

Regarding notifications (in case of an emergency), notifications will go out to those on the JBPHH water system in a variety of ways:

- o ADHOC (on base text/phone call system)
- o PPV resident notifications via email o T
- enant leadership emails from Commanding Officer to all on the base, to include schools, NEX, commissary, post office, Starbucks, etc.
- o Installation Commanding Officer Facebook Live updates o Social media and website updates from the Joint Task Force, Navy Region Hawai'i, and the Installation level. o Press releases/conferences
- o Ombudsman and other support network notifications o And as required, door to door notifications
- o Of note, the CRI will have to be notified to as directed

☐ Public notification in case of an emergency is the responsibility of HI-EMA and DEM. Their methods are summarized here: ☐ Full descriptions of the systems capabilities, and limitations, is available here: Stay Informed (www.honolulu.gov)

EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM (EAS)	WIRELESS EMERGENCY ALERTS (WEA)	OUTDOOR WARNING SIRENS
Can interrupt programming to deliver urgent emergency info on: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Broadcast TV• Cable• Radio• Satellite radio Tested monthly on first business day.	Sent to cell phones in affected geographic areas automatically. You don't need to sign up. Short, text-like messages. Nationwide tests periodically as scheduled by FEMA.	Warning sirens are located primarily along coastal areas for use in tsunami warnings. Can be used for other events. Loud "Steady Tone". Tested monthly on first business day at 11:45 a.m.

Question 2, Lacey Quintero - You mentioned "School Liaison". This is a volunteer position so what happens if the School Liaison is not available or off island in these minutes following worst case scenario? How have they been trained for this situation?

Response: We have a multi-faceted, over-lapping notification approach, so should someone not be available, other notification systems would apply.

Question 3, Lacey Quintero - You mentioned social media? Which ones specifically?

Response: <https://www.facebook.com/NavyRegionHawaii>
<https://www.facebook.com/JBPHH/>
<https://www.instagram.com/jointbasephh/>
<https://twitter.com/NavRegHawaii>

Question 4, Lacey Quintero - You mentioned spouse support organizations. Are these volunteer positions? If yes, what is protocol if volunteer is not available/off island? How have they been trained for this situation?

Response: We have a multi-faceted, over-lapping notification approach, so should someone not be available, other notification systems would apply.

Question 5, Lacey Quintero - Going door to door was also mentioned. Do you have people designated today to do this door to door? How many military are designated today? How many civilians are designated today? How many contractors are designated today? How have they been trained for this situation?

Response: Door to door communication are situationally dependent. We have the capability to flex to the demand dependent on the situation.

Question 6, Marti Townsend - Can Navy put out emergency alerts through their app (the QR code of which is on their last slide of the presentation)?

Response: No, the app was not intended to provide emergency alerts.

(Note: Response to questions 7,8,9 and 11 through 40 are found at following Question 40.)

Question 7, Walter Chun - We would like photographs and illustrations showing the presence of the aquifer at the project sites.

Question 8, Walter Chun - The photographs and illustrations should show the location of all entries and possible entries of contaminants to the aquifer.

Question 9, Walter Chun - Photographs of the mitigations to protect the aquifer.

Question 11, Walter Chun - The tanks are vented to the outside. Please provide locations and photographs of these vents for each tank. Included in this request is the ventilation intake above the tank gallery or wherever the intake vent is.

Question 12, Walter Chun - The information above should also be provided in relation to the surrounding neighborhoods.

Question 13, Walter Chun - Pg 14 The oil pressure door (OPD) at the bottom of the tank gallery is designed to automatically seal off the tank gallery in the event of a spill. "The JTF-RH's prior work to seal cracks and openings in the floor, there is moderate risk that large amounts of standing petroleum could

release into the environment.” A risk assessment was conducted, and it was decided that leaving the OPD in the open position presents the lowest risk to the environment and aquifer. Enclosure 3 provides a detailed analysis of the disposition of the OPD. Please provide a copy of Enclosure 3 as well as the other Enclosures. We have a grave concern that the decision to accept a “lowest risk” to the environment and aquifer is acceptable. At this time, we are asking if the EPA and DOH reviewed and approved this risk assessment?

Question 14, Walter Chun - In response to a question the Navy informed the CRI at the public meeting on 10/4/2023 that 900 gallons of AFFF was in pipe(s) in the tank gallery. The fire suppression system was disabled and the decision to NOT remove the AFFF was made to not delay defueling. CONCERN: AFFF termed the “forever chemicals” are known carcinogens and they do NOT breakdown in the environment or over time. The OPD will remain open to allow fuel to flow down to the pump house at Pearl Harbor, if there was an uncontrolled release. The protection and containment of the AFFF piping with the 900 gallons of AFFF is not addressed in the plan documents that we could find. Should any action in the fire or release response cause damage or loss of integrity the AFFF could be mixed with the fuel as it flows past the aquifer. What specific containment and protective measures to prevent the release of the AFFF piping in the tunnel are provided?

Question 15, Walter Chun - Pgs 7 to 11 provide risk assessments for various scenarios and recommendations and actions for mitigation. What is the status of the mitigation actions? Which recommendations or mitigation actions were not completed and will be unmitigated for the defueling operations? Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) are mentioned throughout the document, please provide copies of these PHAs and risk assessments.

Question 16, Walter Chun - The illustrations provided in Pgs 7 to 11 are very helpful, please identify the location of the aquifer and entries to the aquifer for the individual scenarios.

Question 17, Walter Chun - We were informed that 400 protective measures for the aquifer were in place. Are there pictures, illustrations, and descriptions of these 400 protective measures? Please provide.

Question 18, Walter Chun - Emergency sump pumps and other types of equipment to move fuel in the event of a release and flooding are described. Is there an emergency backup power for these pumps and equipment to ensure continued corrective actions to protect the aquifer and environment?

Question 19, Walter Chun - At the open house on 10/3 we were informed that there were 5 emergency generators. The maintenance and testing of these generators were completed. We are mindful that a lot of the existing systems and new systems were installed over decades and concerned that everything is compatible and consistent with an acceptable industry or equivalent standard. Is there an assessment report for the design, installation, and maintenance of the emergency backup system? For example, does the system comply with a standard such as the National Electrical Code or equivalent?

Question 20, Walter Chun - The ventilation fan in Adit 3 was identified as the only ventilator for the tunnel. In the event of an emergency the ventilation in the tunnel would be a life support or critical piece of equipment. Critical equipment backup systems are described in NFPA 70 -Section 708. Were inspections and evaluations of the critical systems, e.g., ventilation, emergency lighting, alarms, etc. completed? Were all deficiencies corrected and operational testing conducted routinely? Are the critical systems separated from other support systems? Please provide the evaluation report or whatever documentation for the critical systems that were conducted.

Question 21, Walter Chun - Pg 12 list the spill response exercises and Pg 7 identifies the establishment of the Interagency Spill Response Planning Team (ISRPT) – why is the State of Hawaii Agencies not included in the exercises and the ISRPT? In the event of a release how will the State of Hawaii emergency management protocols, public notifications, DOH assessments, etc. be handled if they are not involved in the planning? Have all emergency responders, including State responders, completed and met the OSHA requirements for hazardous waste operations and emergency response (HAZWOPER) (29CFR1910.120)?

Question 22, Walter Chun - Pg 12 list the spill response exercises. Please provide the after-action reports and lessons learned with recommendation and status of corrective actions for each of these exercises. Will the EPA/DOH ensure the completion of the corrective actions identified in these exercises before authorizing the defueling operations to proceed on October 16? What actions were not completed or addressed through a risk assessment? Please provide copies of any risk assessments to address corrective actions/lessons learned.

Question 23, Walter Chun - Pg 13 the Hotel Pier fuel oil reclamation (FOR) line repairs will not be replaced because it was determined, by the JTF-RH and EPA/DOH that its use and the secondary containment is not required. The EPA and DOH “conditionally agreed” to the above. Please provide the information for the conditions and the basis for the conditional agreement. Our concern is the release of fuel oil into the harbor and surrounding areas. Documentation for the Hotel Pier concerns were also requested by the CRI at the public meeting on 10/4/2023.

Question 24, Walter Chun - Pgs 15 & 16 list the regulatory approvals required for unconditional approval to start defueling operations on October 16, 2023. Is the final unconditional approval from the EPA and DOH? Please provide a status of the regulatory approvals and an on-going update. We were informed at the public meeting on 10/4/2023 that EPA approved the start of defueling; however, DOH approval is pending. The question above is intended to inquire about the regulatory approval of the DOH at this time.

Question 25, Walter Chun - Pgs 19 to 23 describe the various operations, e.g., “Tank Main Defueling CONOP”. Each of the procedures identifies the safety measures for the operation. The process hazard analysis (PHA) identifies critical, serious, moderate, negligible, and administrative risks. Please provide these PHAs with the risks, recommendations, corrective actions, and the status of the corrective actions. Provide with the recommendation and corrective actions the post risk analysis and risk mitigation, i.e., critical risks were mitigated to negligible or administrative risks.

Question 26, Walter Chun - The repacking and other procedures refer to the lockout/tagout (LOTO) procedures. Please identify when and where the allowance to use a tagout vs a lockout, especially for critical valves and equipment that have a high risk for contamination of the aquifer and environment. Were all personnel, including all contractor personnel trained and qualified for the LOTO procedures and program? Explain lock, tag, try?

Question 27, Walter Chun - We received information at the Open House on 10/3 regarding the LOTO procedures and requirements. Please provide a copy of the LOTO procedures.

Question 28, Walter Chun - The risk assessment and the actions to address the OPD and decision to leave it open is a concern. It is addressed in the first question above. During the open house the explanation to leave the OPD open to allow fuel to the pump house leaves our concern the protection of the aquifer. Fuel flowing past the entry to the aquifer requires a lot more information and assurances that the aquifer is protected. A level of reliance and credibility to accept the action to leave the OPD open is needed. Please provide the risk assessment and the mitigations.

Question 29, Walter Chun - The exit route from the tank gallery to the entry to the tunnel is very long. What are the specific actions to address compliance with the OSHA standards for exit paths, areas of refuge, etc? How many people in the tunnel at any given time and what provisions for their evacuation? The emergency evacuation plan as well as emergency response plans for other types of emergencies are provided in what documents? Compliance with the OSHA egress must be addressed in more detail. Has there been a request for variance or alternate standard submitted to OSHA?

Question 30, Walter Chun - Did the exercise scenarios and exercises themselves evaluate the evacuation procedures and effectiveness? What are the evacuation times from the farthest point in the tunnel to the exit discharge?

Question 31, Walter Chun - Backup generators are provided for the tunnel to ensure continuous power is provided. An evaluation was conducted of the design, installation, maintenance and procedures for the operations of the backup system. Is this evaluation provided in writing? Please provide a copy of the evaluation be provided? Also see item 4 above (*Note: refers to question #18 in the spreadsheet and this document*).

Question 32, Walter Chun - The ventilation system(s) for the tunnel is critical. The discharge of the ventilation shafts and ducting is not readily identified in the documents so far. Please provide evaluations of the ventilation system to ensure adequate ventilation for the workers, during emergencies, and the maintenance and operational monitoring of this critical system. Is there a backup ventilation supply and exhaust?

Question 33, Walter Chun - The construction of the tunnels in the 1940's included support tunnels and ventilation shafts, ducting, and openings. Since then, construction surrounding the tunnels, e.g. Foster Village, Moanalua, etc. was completed. Please provide copies of the ventilation systems after the tunnel was constructed, and the sealing or closure of ventilation shafts and systems that could affect the residential neighborhoods surrounding the tunnel. Please provide the risk assessments and mitigations for this part of the defueling and operations for the tunnel.

Question 34, Walter Chun - The tanks are ventilated at the top of the tanks, what protections, if any, is provided for the release of contaminants, smoke, vapor, etc. from these stacks? Please provide the risk assessment and protective measures for the vent stacks. Also provide a location of these stacks on the exterior of the tunnel, including their relationship to the surrounding neighborhoods.

Question 35, Walter Chun - As the tanks are emptied it is assumed that the fuel rich atmosphere inside the tank will be mixed with incoming oxygen changing the risks. Was an evaluation and risk assessment conducted of the change in the interior of the tanks during and after the defueling? Is it possible for any ignition to occur from entry through the tank vents? Would a fire near these stacks pose a fire or explosion hazard?

Question 36, Walter Chun - Does the emergency plans and exercises address the actions for the ventilation systems and shafts as it affects the public? Please provide copies of the actions that will be taken. Including notification to the public and the DOH.

Question 37-38, Walter Chun - The tunnel was coated and maintained for decades. The painting and coatings forty and fifty years ago contained lead, including some of the fuels that may have been handled. A reference and a copy of the lead exposures to the workers was not available. Please provide a copy of the exposure assessments, protective measures, worksite monitoring, and medical monitoring for lead exposures. Environmental monitoring for lead as well as other contaminants should be provided as well.

Question 39, Walter Chun - During the open house I was informed that the recent announcement of the staging of environmental monitoring stations would occur and that the DOH requested this data. Will monitoring be conducted off base and in residential areas around the tunnel? What contaminants will be included in this monitoring? Please provide the monitoring plan for this action.

Question 40, Walter Chun - The assurance that the tunnel contains systems, equipment, etc. that is intrinsically safe. Please provide the assessment and the results of inspections, and testing of the intrinsically safe conditions of the tunnel to prevent or limit the ignition sources.

Response to 7,8,9 and 11 through 40: Defueling Supplement 2 was submitted to the Regulators and released to the public in May 2023. In addition to the JTF-RH hosted Defueling Open House in May 2023 and again in October 2023 which provided the public with the opportunity to ask questions, JTF-RH also presented a comprehensive defueling review and answered questions at the public CRI meeting on 4 October.

The regulators (DOH and EPA) approved Defueling Supplement 2 and provided approvals for JTF-RH to commence defueling operations on October 16 according to published plans. DOH and EPA information and conditional approval letters to gravity defuel are available here:

<https://health.hawaii.gov/news/newsroom/departments-of-health-conditionally-approves-defueling-of-red-hill-tanks-setting-stage-for-defueling-to-begin/>

<https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2023-10/epa-approval-rhbfsf-defueling-preparedness-report-2023-10-03.pdf>

For any question related to documents, drawings, schematics, or technical information related to the facility, the Red Hill Bulk Fuel Storage Facility is part of an active military installation and subject to information operations security considerations. Please follow the FOIA process in your request for this information.

Question 41, Alfred Kaka Hiona Medeiros - Can we have a kanaka maoli Cultural Practitioner on site during defueling? (Admrl Wade did not answer question but said "Joe is the entry point".)

Response: During Defueling operations which commenced on 16 OCT and will continue through the completion of gravity defueling and removal of residual fuel, currently scheduled through April 2024, there are no tours, or possibility of adding an additional personnel, during these operations. Should there be an opportunity after defueling is complete, the Navy will inform the CRI of any periods where this may (or may not) be possible.

Question 43, MAJ Feindt – Who ordered this project of air quality monitoring? What level of command?

Response: This air monitoring initiative was not mandated by regulators, rather it is an initiative by the Navy. The air monitoring stations are part of the Navy's plan to establish a baseline of current air quality conditions and will be used to identify potential future changes in air quality in the unlikely event of an incident.

Question 44, MAJ Feindt - Why are they placed in these particular locations?

Response: Air monitoring station locations were distributed across JBPHH, based on proximity to Red Hill, high vehicle traffic areas, and residential and community locations.

Question 45, MAJ Feindt - Why are they placed in these particular locations?

Response: Air monitoring station locations were distributed across JBPHH, based on proximity to Red Hill, high vehicle traffic areas, and residential and community locations.

Question 46, MAJ Feindt - Why now at this particular time?

Response: The air monitoring stations are part of the Navy's plan to establish a baseline of current air quality conditions and will be used to identify potential future changes in air quality. While air quality monitoring is not a regulator-mandated prerequisite for defueling, these stations can provide an early-warning indicator that improves response time in the unlikely event of an incident.

Question 46, MAJ Feindt - Why are the air quality monitors not in homes on bases?

Response: Outdoor air monitoring stations are monitoring air quality to represent ambient conditions and those that would be potentially influenced first by an emergency event - providing an early-warning indicator that improves response time in the unlikely event of an incident.

Question 52, MAJ Feindt - How often are they posted?

Response: Results are posted monthly.

Question 53, Susan Gorman-Chang - Is there a way for folks to get continuous read-outs on an app on their phones?

Response: Not at this time, but will be taken for consideration as part of the dashboard.

Question 54, Marti Townsend - Can you revise your Defueling Dashboard which currently shows the number of only the gallons of jet fuel that will be taken out during Navy's "Defueling" Phase and DOES NOT count the jet fuel sludge at the bottom of the tanks which is considered by the Navy to be part of "Closure" Phase?

Response: As the counting up direction of the dashboard has been in-place for multiple weeks it will continue as configured to provide a clear and consistent message on defueling progress.

Navy will continue to utilize the cell phone application and "Defueling Dashboard" approach to address future tank closure activities. It is anticipated there will be a substantial rework of the application to provide information relevant to the closure process. There are multiple actions beyond sludge removal that should be effectively communicated during closure activities. The Navy welcomes CRI inputs to improve these communication tools.

Question 58, CRI - We want a copy of the EOC Log where these complaints came in and were recorded by the Navy as required

Response: Summary information from the EOC log is posted on the Safewaters web site (<https://jbphh-safewaters.org>), as required by the 2023 Administrative Consent Order. The call log contains Personally Identifiable information (PII) and is not publicly releasable.

Question 60, CRI - How many water tests were conducted?

Response:

EOC Log Sept 2023 Total Calls: 35 Calls with Water Quality Questions: 34 Water Testing Requested: 1 Water Testing Complete: 1 TPH Detections: 0 Total Concerns Addressed: 35	EOC Log Oct 1-31, 2023 Total Calls: 41 Calls with Water Quality Questions: 41 Water Testing Requested: 16 Water Testing Complete: 16 TPH Detections: 0 Total Concerns Addressed: 41	EOC Log Nov 1-7, 2023 Total Calls: 2 Calls with Water Quality Questions: 2 Water Testing Requested: 2 Water Testing Complete: 0 TPH Detections: 0 Total Concerns Addressed: 0
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Question 61, CRI - When did each family get their results? (date/time)

Response: The community liaison communicates validated results as soon as received. This occurred on a rolling basis (first tested, first reported) as tests were not all requested or conducted at the same time.

Question 62, CRI - What were the results for the families who got their test results back?

Response: All rapid response tests reported non-detect. Validated laboratory results were provided to residents, but can be viewed by the public on JBPPH Safewaters web site.

Question 63, CRI - How many times did the Navy contact EPA? If yes, who did they contact?

Response: The Navy follows the requirements set forth in the approved Inter-agency LTM Drinking Water Monitoring Plan

Question 66 - CRI - Results of Waiawa well testing--actual levels NOT just Non-Detect or Detect

Response: All results are posted on the JBPHH-Safe Waters website. All analyses are conducted in accordance with EPA testing requirements in EPA certified laboratories.

Question 68, CRI - Please list what military branch, agency or department or regulator has the responsibility to test the homes on military bases for contamination of any kind.

Response: The JBPHH Drinking Water System is managed, maintained, and tested by the Navy (JBPHH, NAVFAC, and Region). EPA and DOH also have the capability to performing testing on the system.

Question 69, CRI - Who created the protocol for testing homes on military bases for contamination of any kind.

Response: The Navy follows the Federal and State statutory and regulatory requirements; such as the Clean Water Act. Specifically with regard the water testing, the Navy follows the requirements set forth in the approved Inter-agency LTM Drinking Water Monitoring Plan.

Question 74, CRI - We are requesting a hot water tests in houses that have experienced water contamination issues. To date, tests have only been done on cold water.

Response: The Navy samples in accordance with regulator-approved protocols.

Question 75, CRI - We are requesting tests on the pipes in houses that have experienced water contamination issues.

Response: The Navy samples in accordance with regulator-approved protocols.

Question 77, CRI - We request the Navy take a proactive, cautionary tone in all Press Releases and don't discredit victims of water contamination.

Response: Request is noted.

Question 82, Walter Chun - The Navy's response is triggered and focused only on fuel. The testing seems limited to fuel related contaminants to allow them to say it is not fuel. The human health impact should be addressed - what is causing the skin irritation? Work backwards with the Toxicologists and physicians to investigate what chemicals that could be in the water that would cause this acute effects? Biological contaminants should not be ruled out without testing, or fluoridating chemicals, etc.

Response: Sampling is performed in accordance with the approved Inter Agency Drinking Water System LTM Plan. Under the plan, the Navy currently tests for over sixty chemicals.

Question 84, Walter Chun - The sampling of the water must include other suspected contaminants. For example, the impact of the corrosion or contact with steel or galvanized or PVC or copper piping with TPH.

Response: Sampling is performed in accordance with the approved Inter Agency Drinking Water System LTM Plan. Under the plan, the Navy currently tests for over sixty chemicals.

Question 85, Walter Chun - The Navy fluoridate and chlorinate the drinking water on the bases. I believe we heard of numerous complaints of chlorine in the water as they were flushing the water lines. Introduction of these chemicals if not strictly controlled and monitored can result in health effects, e.g., skin irritations. The investigation must include how this process works, what are the safety measures, are they followed, etc. Did they check the introduction of these chemicals around the time of the complaints? Are they testing at the homes for these chemicals? Slugs with these chemicals is a possibility.

Response: Drinking Water sampling is performed in accordance with the approved Inter Agency Drinking Water System LTM Plan. Under the plan, the Navy currently tests for over sixty chemicals are tested for in the water in accordance with Clean Water Act. Chlorine and fluoride levels are monitored throughout the system.